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BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
WIcH V. FLEMING:
THE DILEMMA OF A HARMLESS DEFECT IN A WILL
The Texas supreme court's decision in Wich v. Fleming' reaffirms its
continuing requirement of strict compliance with the Texas Probate Code.
Although thoroughly convinced that the testatrix intended to make a val-
id will, the court voided the document entirely, merely because the wit-
nesses signed a self-proving affidavit in the will instead of an attestation
clause.
This harsh, hypertechnical approach to will execution clashes head-on
with modem trends allowing property disposition at death without will
formalities. The Wich decision illustrates a need for a substantial compli-
ance statute which would solve the dilemma faced by courts when a will
has a harmless defect. This Note will first trace the historical develop-
ment of the Texas will statutes; second, it will examine the Wich case and
the basis for its reasoning; third, it will discuss the trend towards effectu-
ating a transferor's intent through vehicles other than wills; and finally,
it will examine the need for legislative reform in the law of wills by pro-
posing a substantial compliance statute.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF TEXAS WILL REQUIREMENTS
The current Texas will formalities are deeply rooted in English legal his-
tory. The 1540 Statute of Wills,2 which repealed the common-law rule
prohibiting a devise of lands, simply required that testamentary realty gifts
be in writing. It did not require the testator himself to write or sign the
will, nor did it require witnesses. Needless to say, this required writing
did not strongly guarantee genuineness. The oral testament disposing of
chattels was valid until the enactment of the Statute of Frauds in 1677. 3
This legislation required the devise of chattel property to be in writing.
Further, to prevent fraud, the Act required a will disposing of land to be
attested to by three or four subscribing witnesses. The testator was also
required to sign the will.4
In 1840, the Congress of the Republic of Texas enacted a general statute
of wills, copied almost literally from the Virginia statute of wills.5 Since
the Virginia statute closely followed the Statute of Frauds, and since no
'Wich v. Fleming, 652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
232 Hen. VIII, c. 1, § 1 (1540), cited in 9 E. BAILEY, TExAs LAw or WILLS § 268 (Texas
Practice 1 268 (Texas Practice 1968).
329 Car. II, c. 3 § 5 (1677), cited in 9 E. BAIIEY, TExAs LAW oF WILLS § 268 (Texas Practice
1968).
4See generally 9 E. BAILEY, TEXAS LAw OF WILLS §§ 268, 276 (Texas Practice 1968).
$Act of Jan. 28, 1840, § 2 H. GAUMEL, LAWS Or TExAs, 341 (1898) cited in 9 E. BAILEY,
To.s LAw or WILLS § 276 (Texas Practice 1968).
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outstanding changes have been made in the Texas will statutes since 1840,
it is correct to say that the modem Texas Wills Act follows the Statute
of Frauds legislation. The only basic difference is that the Texas law pre-
scribes the same formalities for devising personal property as it does for
devising land.
The 1840 Texas Act's provision with respect to attesting witnesses re-
mains virtually the same today as when originally enacted. Section 59 of
the Texas Probate Code sets out three requirements for a will which is
not wholly in the testator's handwriting: 1) the will must be in writing;
2) it must be signed by the testator or by another person for him by his
direction and in his presence; and 3) two credible witnesses must attest
to the will by signing their names to it in the presence of the testator.6
Every last will and testament, except where otherwise provided by law, shall be
in writing and signed by the testator in person or by another person for him by
his direction and in his presence, and shall, if not wholly in the handwriting of
the testator, be attested by two (2) or more credible witnesses above the age of
fourteen (14) years who shall subscribe their names thereto in their own hand-
writing in the presence of the testator. Such a will or testament may, at the time
of its execution or at any subsequent date during the lifetime of the testator and
the witnesses, be made self-proved, and the testimony of the witnesses in the pro-
bate thereof may be made unnecessary, by the affidavits of the testator and the
attesting witnesses, made before an officer authorized to take acknowledgments
to deeds of conveyance and to administer oaths under the laws of this State. Pro-
vided that nothing shall require an affidavit, acknowledgment or certificate of
any testator or testatrix as a prerequisite to self-proof of a will or testament other
than the certificate set out below. The affidavits shall be evidenced by a certifi-
cate, with official seal affixed, of such officer attached or annexed to such will
or testament in form and contents substantially as follows:
THE STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF
Before me, the undersigned authority, on this date personally appeared
S_, and , known to me to be the testator
and the witnesses, respectively, whose names are subscribed to the annexed or
foregoing instrument in their respective capacities, and, all of said persons being
by me duly sworn, the said _ testator, declared to me and to the
said witnesses in my presence that said instrument is his last will and testament,
and that he had willingly made and executed it as his free act and deed for the
purposes therein expressed; and the said witnesses, each on his oath stated to me,
in the presence and hearing of the said testator, that the said testator had declared
to them that said instrument is his last will and testament, and that he executed
same as such and wanted each of them to sign it as a witness; and upon their
oaths each witness stated further that they did sign the same as witnesses in the
presence of the said testator and at his request; that he was at that time eighteen
years of age or over (or being under such age, was or had been lawfully married,
or was then a member of the armed forces of the United States or of an auxiliary
thereof or of the Maritime Service) and was of sound mind; and that each of said
HeinOnline  -- 35 Baylor L. Rev. 905 1983
BAYLOR LAW REVIEW
In addition, since 1955, the statute has authorized use of a self-proving
affidavit, signed by the testator and the witnesses. This affidavit allows
the will to be admitted to probate without the witnesses' courtroom testi-
mony as to the will's proper execution, thus facilitating the probate pro-
cess. The statute provides the form of the self-proving affidavit in full.
Texas was the second state to implement the use of the self-proving affi-
davit as a way to simplify probate. 7 Since wills are generally admitted
to probate as a matter of routine, the procedure serves a useful function.
However, self-proving affidavits soon caused a significant problem.
Some attorneys took short-cuts in drafting wills, usually with one of two
results: 1) the testator would sign the will and the self-proving affidavit,
while the witnesses signed only the latter; or 2) the testator and the wit-
nesses signed only the self-proving affidavit.$ Litigation challenging will
validity followed, and in Texas, the shortcuts proved lethal. The recent
case of Wich v. Fleming9 reaffirmed Texas' hard-line, conservative posi-
tion of voiding the will entirely due to strict construction of section 59
of the Probate Code, notwithstanding the testator's obvious intent.
witnesses was then at least fourteen years of age.
Testator
Witness
Witness
Subscribed and acknowledged before me by the said - , testator,
and subscribed and sworn to before me by the said - and
witnesses, this - day of - A.D.
(SEAL)
(Signed)
(Official Capacity of Officer)
A self-proved will may be admitted to probate without the testimony of any
subscribing witness, but otherwise it shall be treated no differently than a will
not self-proved. In particular and without limiting the generality of the forego-
ing, a self-proved will may be contested, or revoked or amended by a codicil in
exactly the same fashion as a will not self-proved.
Tax. PRon. CODvE ANN. § 59 (Vernon 1980).
'The earliest legislation was enacted in Nevada in 1953, followed by Texas in 1955. Most
similar legislation in other states resulted after the approval of the affidavit in the Uniform
Probate Code in 1969. Today, at least thirty states authorize the use of self-proved wills
in some form. Schneider, Self-Proved Wills-A Trap for the Unwary, 8 N. Ky. L. REv. 539
(1981).
Old. at 542.
9652 S.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
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II. WicH: THE COURT MANDATES STRICT COMPLIANCE
When one examines the facts in Wich and then looks at the supreme
court's decision, it becomes obvious that the law has become a sword rather
than a shield. As construed by this case and its predecessor decisions, the
Texas statute becomes a trap for the unwary instead of protecting the tes-
tator.
Dr. Mabel Giddings Wilkin, a psychiatrist, executed her will at a bank
in Brenham, Texas, in front of her attorney and a bank employee. She
signed her name on the will's last page. The witnesses did not sign imme-
diately below her signature as no spaces were provided on the will. In-
stead, they signed at the end of the self-proving affidavit located at the
bottom of the same page in blanks marked "WITNESSES." Mrs. Wilkin
also signed below the self-proving clause, as provided in section 59. The
witnesses testified to these facts in lengthy depositions filed with the court,
reiterating their intent to act as witnesses, after contestants brought suit
:n the form technicality. All parties to the lawsuit agreed that Dr. Wilkin
and the witnesses believed they were validly executing the will.10
The county court denied probate, and the proponents appealed. In a
:ommon-sense decision, the court of appeals reversed the decision and
rdered the will be admitted to probate.11 The appeals court held the self-
?roving clause to be superfluous, thus validating the witnesses' signatures
as proper will attestation.
The contestants asserted that Boren v. Boren12 controlled the case's dis-
osition. In Boren, the testator signed a one page will. The affidavit with
:he testator's signature and the witnesses' signatures was on a separate
?age.13 In denying probate, the Texas supreme court held that the self-prov-
ng clause was not part of the will and that executing a valid will was
i condition precedent to the usefulness of a self-proving affidavit. The
:ourt said the affidavit's only purpose was to dispense with wifness testi-
nony at probate. 14 The Boren decision spawned numerous progeny, all
iolding that an attached, witnessed self-proving affidavit could not vali-
late an "unwitnessed will."Is Two courts of appeals cases, Cherry v. Reed 6
'lId. at 354.
"Fleming v. Wich, 638 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. App.- Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), rev'd 652
.W.2d 353 (Tex. 1983).
IzBoren v. Boren, 402 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. 1966).
13Id. at 728.
141d, at 729.
ISShriners Hospitals for Crippled Children v. St. Jude Children's Research Hospital, Inc.,
i29 S.W.2d 767 (Tex, Civ. App. -Dallas 1981, no writ); Rodgers v. Estate of King, 614
;.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App. -Waco 1981, no writ); In re Estate of McDougal, 552 S.W,2d
i87 (Tex. Civ. App. -Tyler 1977, writ ref'd n.re.); McLeroy v. Douthit, 535 S.W.2d 771
Tex. Civ. App. -Fort Worth), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 539 S.W.2d 351 (Tex. 1976);
n re Estate of Pettengill, 508 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. -Amarillo 1974, writ refd n.r.e.).16Cherry v. Reed, 512 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Civ. App. -Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd
1983] NOTES
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and Jones v. Jones,17 held that even if the witnesses' signatures on the self-
proving affidavit were on the will's last page, they still did not attest the
will.
However, the court of appeals in Fleming v. Wich wisely declined to
follow the Boren rule: "After careful consideration, we have concluded
that to apply the Boren rule to the facts before us would be to exalt form
over substance. The Boren rule should not be blindly applied to defeat
the right of the testatrix to dispose of her estate as she desired."8
The court distinguished Fleming v. Wich from Jones v. Jones on the
basis of strong evidence presented by the proponents in Wich.19 The at-
torney who prepared the will and the bank's assistant cashier both swore
that they signed as witnesses to the will execution at the request of Dr.
Wilkin and in her presence. Also, Dr. Wilkin signed both the will and
the self-proving provision. Thus, the high level of proof offered by the
proponents significantly affected the court's ruling. In effect, the appeals
court held that since witnesses had signed the instrument in the testatrix's
presence, that an attestation had occurred.
The appeals court further bolstered its decision by citing the language
in Tucker v. Hill.2o In Tucker, the court said section 59 is "silent as to
where the witnesses must sign a will."21 Also, the "intent to act as a wit-
ness may be evidenced by the facts and circumstances surrounding the
signing of the will."22 Therefore, in Fleming v. Wich, the witnesses' signa-
tures on the affidavit, coupled with testimony proving their intent, estab-
lished that the will had indeed been attested.
Unfortunately, the Texas supreme court disagreed with this reasoning
and reversed the court of appeals, invoking the Boren "condition prece-
n.r.e.). The writing consisted of two pages. The first page contained will provisions, and
two lines of the last paragraph carried over onto the second page. Following these lines was
the self-proving clause, signed by the testatrix and the witnesses. The testatrix signed only
the self-proving clause.
17Jones v. Jones, 630 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. - Dallas 1980, no writ). The testator
signed an attestation clause, immediately followed by the self-proving affidavit which con-
tained two sets of signatures. One set was on the same page as the end of the purported
will. The court held that neither set was affixed to the will as required by Boren or section
59. The facts in this case most closely resemble those in Fleming v. Wich, but the Jones opin-
ion makes no mention of witnesses' testimony or other evidence at the trial court.
18638 S.W.2d at 35-6.
191d. at 36.
loTucker v. Hill, 577 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1979, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). The will consisted of two typewritten pages. The decedent signed her name at the
bottom of the first page, while two witnesses signed below an attestation clause on the sec-
ond page. Even though the attestation clause referred to the first page as the "foregoing in-
strument," the court concluded the clause to be part of the will and admitted it to probate.
2ld. at 322.
uald. at 323. See also Fowler v. Stagner, 55 Tex. 393, 400 (1881). The court said it is not
material in what part of the instrument the witnesses sign their names if it is done with the
purpose of attesting the will as subscribing witnesses.
[Vol. 35:901
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dent" language in voiding the will.23 In doing so, the supreme court took
a highly technical, mechanical approach towards the problem. The court
reasoned that the will and the self-proving affidavit require different types
of witness intent and that each clause serves different purposes: 'The at-
testing witness is expressing his present intent to act as a witness. The wit-
ness executing a self-proving affidavit is swearing to the validity of an
act already performed."24
In effect, the majority opinion created a new law of intent, holding that
a witness cannot intend to attest to a will and execute a self-proving affi-
davit at the same time. This conclusion contradicts decisions which hold
that a witness may indeed sign with dual intention. The Texas supreme
court has repeatedly interpreted the term "subscribe" in section 59 to in-
clude a signature made as part of an affidavit or acknowledgment if the
evidence shows the signer also intended to attest and subscribe. In Franks
v. Chapman,25 a witness signed below a writing containing an acknow-
ledgment, while in Saathoff v. Saathoff,26 a witness signed below a sim-
ple affidavit. Both signatures were held to be proper attestation, despite
the fact that they were made to serve two purposes.
Further, the Wich court refused even to consider evidence of the wit-
nesses' intent. The court held that the Boren rule applies even if the wit-
nesses are available to prove proper execution when the will is offered
for probate. 27 The court relied on McGrew v. Bartlett,2s in which the will
was denied probate because the witnesses signed only the self-proving af-
fidavit, even though one witness testified that she and the other witness
thought they were signing in the right places. The Wich majority stressed
its view that "even clear evidence of intent cannot abrogate the manda-
tory provisions of the probate code."29
Justice Robertson's strong dissent points out that section 59 of the Pro-
bate Code requires only that witnesses attest the will.30 It does not specify
the signature location nor does it say that the self-proving affidavit can-
not fulfill the function of an attestation clause. 31 Justice Robertson also
3652 S.W.2d at 354.
2id. at 313.
ZsFranks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159, 160 (1885).
26Saathoff v. Saathoff, 101 S.W.2d 910,912 (Tex. Civ. App. -San Antonio 1937, writ refd).
27652 S.W.zd at 355.
aMcGrew v. Bartlett, 387 S.W,2d 702 (Tex. Civ. App. -Houston 1965, writ ref'd). The
Wich court ignores the factual basis for the McGrew decision. The testator and witnesses
in McGrew signed only the self-proving affidavit, despite the fact that blanks were provid-
ed following the will. These unsigned blanks thus evidenced greater possibility of fraud.
In Wich, the testatrix signed the will, and the witnesses signed following the self-proving
affidavit in the only blanks provided for then. Thus, the Wich facts can be easily distinguished.
2652 S.W.2d at 353. See Morris v. Morris, 642 S.W.2d 448, 450 (Tex. 1982).
30652 S.W.2d at 356. (Robertson, J., dissenting).
31In effect, the supreme court has altered section 59 to read: "(witnesses) shall subscribe
their names thereto above the text of a self-proving affidavit in their own handwriting in
NOTES19831
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suggested that the self-proving affidavit may serve the same function as
an attestation clause, proving that the witnesses, at the testator's request
and in his presence, have signed their names as witnesses to the testator's
will.32 In other words, the self-proving affidavit should be considered part
of the will instead of a "separate" document, and affidavit signatures should
be viewed as signatures to the will. In addition, the dissent pointed out
that only one other state, Montana, has adopted Boren's reasoning. 33 Three
states - Oklahoma, Kansas and Florida - have specifically held that Boren
is not controlling in their states. 34 In these states, the Wilkin will would
have been admitted to probate instead of totally voided.
The dissent emphasized that Boren has led to "harsh results and created
a trap for the testator whose lips are forever sealed. The time has come
to reexamine the hypertechnical compliance with the Probate Code as re-
quired by Boren."35
The Wich facts leave virtually no room for doubt as to the testatrix's
intention to create a will. Unlike the "attached" self-proving affidavit in
Boren, the self-proving affidavit in Wich was on the same page as the last
provision of Dr. Wilkins. Justice Robertson stated:
The witnesses' signatures here are less than six inches beneath that
of the textatrix, Dr. Wilkin. Had that six inches in which the
self-proving affidavit is typed been left blank, there would be no
dispute as to proper attestation. Here, there is clearly no evidence
of fraud or undue influence to destroy the credibility of the wit-
ness' attestation. I would hold that a self-proving affidavit can
satisfy the attestation requirements of Section 59 of the Probate
Code, where, as here, witnesses testified unequivocally that they
intended to attest the will of the testatrix. To hold otherwise is
manifestly unjust. Boren v. Boren and its progeny should be
overruled.36
The majority opinion evidences some uneasiness, stating that "if the re-
quirements for disposing of property by will are to be altered, it is the
the presence of the testator."
32652 S.W.2d at 356.33Matter of Estate of Sample, 175 Mont. 98, 572 P.2d 1232 (1977).
4Matter of Estate of Petty, 227 Kan. 697, 608 P.2d 987 (1980) (court stated its policy
was to uphold wills if the form of the will substantially complied with the requirement of
the statute); In re Estate of Cutsinger, 445 P.2d 778, 782 (Okla. 1968) (court said the self-
proving affidavit may serve as attestation of a will since the attestation clause need not be
in any particular form); In re Estate of Charry, 359 So,2d 544, 545 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(court expressly rejected the Boren reasoning stating the 'Texas view places form above sub-
stance and we decline to follow it.") Though not cited in the Wich dissent, a New York case
held likewise. In re Leitstein's Will, 46 Misc.2d 656, 260 N.Y.S.2d 406 (N.Y. Surrogate's
Ct. 1965).
1s652 S.W.2d at 356 (Robertson, J., dissenting).
31Id. at 357-58 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 35:901
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province of the Legislature, not this Court, to effect those changes."37 The
majority also notes that the legislature has amended section 59 twice since
the Boren decisions without modifying the statutory requirements at is-
sue. The court construed this as acquiesence in its statutory interpretation. 39
Clearly, the supreme court totally disregarded the testatrix's intent, re-
lying instead on the past interpretation given section 59. Through its sterile
formalism and disregard of cases recognizing dual intent in signihg, the
court has extended the Boren rule to a case involving absolutely no sug-
gestion of fraud. Certainly, in the case of "separate" self-proving affidav-
its attached to an unsigned will, there is more opportunity for fraud. (Even
in the Boren case, however, it must be remembered that the testator signed
the self-proving affidavit.) But in Wich, the self-proving affidavit was on
the will's last page. Mrs. Wilkin had signed the instrument twice. Logic
and reason suggest giving the will effect, especially since will execution
formalities are designed to prevent fraud and foster the testator's intent.
Legal formalities should not promote frustration of a testator's desires to
dispose of his property. A lay person could not read section 59 and be
assured that he could properly execute a will, given the Wich court's
statutory construction. The result punishes a lay person or one with un-
knowledgeable counsel.
Why does the court demand such strict compliance with its statutory
interpretation7 Is the court seeking to fulfill the purposes underlying will
formalities7 These purposes are defined by Gulliver and Tilson in their
seminal article: 40
1) "ritual" function -to impress the transferor with the significance of
his actions, ensuring the will was really intended to be a testament and
not simply causal language;
2) "evidentiary" function - to prevent fraud, lapse of memory, perjury
and forgery; and
3) "protective" function - to reduce undue influence and imposition upon
the testator. 41
371d. at 355.
38These ministerial reenactments consisted of first changing the age of majority to 18 and
then restoring the last sentence of section 59, which had been mistakenly omitted.
39The court fails to recognize that this reasoning means that the legislature has also re-
enacted Franks v. Chapman, 64 Tex. 159 (1885) (dual intent of witness in signing is permis-
sible) at least five times since 1885.
40Gulliver and Tilson, Classification of Gratuitous Transfers, 51 YALE L.J. 1 (1941).
41Id. at 3-5.
Taken together, these functions serve another end, the channeling function...
when the formalities are complied with, they make testation routine, eliminate
contest, reduce probate costs and court time, and facilitate good estate planning.
When, however, there has been a mechanical blunder, it does not follow that the
purposes of the wills act have been disserved.
Langbein, Crumbling of the Wills Act: Australians Point the Way, 65 A.B.A.J. 1192, 1194
NOTES19831
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None of these purposes justifies the Wich result. First of all, Dr. Wilkin
believed the signing of the self-proving affidavit to be a valid will execu-
tion. She certainly understood the solemnity of her actions. Secondly, the
physical evidence of attestation does not change with substituting an at-
testation clause for a self-proving affidavit. It should be noted that sec-
tion 59 does not require an attestation clause, although most wills utilize
one. Thus, the actual "subscription" by the witnesses satisfies any needed
evidentiary protection.' 2 Third, protecting against undue influence or im-
position is not enhanced by denying probate since both the textatrix and
witnesses subscribed this will exactly as they would any other attested will.
In summary, the basic purposes underlying the will statutes do not jus-
tify the Wich result. 43
The supreme court's decision becomes especially harsh when contrast-
ed with the modem trend of transferring property without will formalities.
III. THE TREND AWAY FROM WILL FORMALITIES
A. Will Substitutes
There are at least three asset categories, known as nonprobate assets,
which are not subject to will disposition or to intestate distribution rules.
These categories have developed recently as society has become more flex-
ible and less preoccupied with formal ceremony. In effect, these devices
serve as will substitutes, transferring property at death without formal
attestation requirements. Examples are:
1) property passing at death pursuant to terms of a contract, as
in life insurance policies and under contributory retirement plans;4
2) property settled in a revocable inter vivos trust; and
3) property passing by right of survivorship, as in a valid joint
(1979).
UPossibly, fraud could be more likely in a Boren set of facts where the signatures do not
appear on the same paper but on one which is physically detached.
One fundamental proposition is that, under a legal system recognizing the indi-
vidualistic institution of private property and granting to the owner to determine
his successors in ownership, the general philosophy of the courts should favor
giving effect to an intentional exercise of that power. This is commonplace enough,
but it needs constant emphasis, for it may be obscured in inordinate preoccupa-
tion with.detail or dialectic. A court absorbed in purely doctrinal arguments may
lose sight of the important and desirable objective of sanctioning what the trans-
feror wanted to do, even though it is convinced that he wanted to do it... [Will
formalities] should not be revered as ends in themselves, enthroning formality
over frustrated intent.
Gulliver and Tilson, supra note 40, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
"See H.J. Mullins & Co. v. Thompson, 51 Tex. 7 (1879); Kirkland v. Kirkland, 359 S.W.2d
651 (Tex. Civ. App. -Fort Worth 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Buehler v. Buehler, 323 S.W.2d
67 (Tex. Civ. App. -Texarkana 1959, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
[Vol. 35:901
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bank account with right of survivorship.
These devices will be examined in detail to exemplify the trend towards
effectuating a transferor's intent.
B. Life Insurance
The dominant will substitute of modem practice is life insurance. 4- The
only significant estate asset that many people have is life insurance pro-
ceeds. A beneficiary designation under the insurance contract has precise-
ly the same function as a will. The transfer at death from the insured to
his beneficiary takes place without regard to will formalities. This will
substitute is legitimate in that, though it functions as a will, its forms ade-
quately serve the functions of the will requirements. The insured signs
a written purchase application in which he designates his beneficiary, and
he also makes payments to the insurer. These "formalities" satisfy eviden-
tiary and cautionary policies, though not in strict compliance with the
wills statute.
C. Revocable Inter vivos Trusts
Revocable inter vivos trusts are especially indicative of the movement
away from strict compliance with the wills statutes. The past few decades
have seen an increased use of the trust arrangement in settling family
wealth; it has become an indispensable tool in estate planning. 46
The typical revocable trust reserves to the settlor the right to trust in-
come for life and the power to revoke or amend, and provides for the
disposition of the trust principal on the settlor's death. 47 Several early cas-
es held the transfers invalid as attempted testamentary dispositions not
executed with the requisites of a will or as incomplete transfers due to
the settlor's retention of control over the property. 48 However, in 1943,
the Texas legislature enacted a statute providing that all trusts were re-
vocable unless expressly made irrevocable. 49 The courts were reluctant
to recognize the statute, but finally did so in 1968.so Thus, the use of re-
vocable trust transfers, in which the settlor conveys legal title to a trust-
ee, was definitely affirmed as a will substitute.
4
'Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 l-LHAv. L. REv. 489, 508-09 (1975).
"See Johanson, Revocable Trusts and Community Property; The Substantive Problems,
47 Tx. L. Rev. 537 (1969).
47Id. at 540.
"$See Fleck v. Baldwin, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W.2d 975 (1943): "[One) cannot retain the
use and full enjoyment of his property during his lifetime and provide that at his death it
shall go to someone other than his legal heirs, without making a will, executed under the
forms and solemnities provided by the statutes on the subject of wills." (emphasis added).
"9Tx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-41 (Vernon 1960).
"Land v. Marshall, 426 S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1968).
19831 NOTES
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The trend towards revocable trusts developed even further, culminat-
ing in the landmark decision of Westerfield v. Huckaby.51 Westerfield es-
tablished the validity of revocable declarations of trust in Texas, despite
the lack of will formalities. The Westerfield facts illuminate the testamen-
tary nature of the transfer.
In 1966, Virginia Miller executed two declarations of trust and quit-
claimed to herself as trustee certain real property. The trusts provided that
properties in trust were for the use and benefit of a Mr. Huckaby and
that upon the settlor's death, the successor trustee was to deliver the prop-
erties outright to Huckaby. Huckaby himself was named as the successor
trustee.52
Mrs. Miller reserved the right to collect any income from the proper-
ties and also the power to revoke the trust at any time or to change bene-
ficiaries s3 In upholding the trust's validity, the court noted a marked shift
in judicial decisions recognizing the validity of such property transfers.5 4
The court distinguished this trust from a will by saying the trust took ef-
fect immediately, while a will becomes operative only upon death5s Prac-
tically, however, they serve the same purpose -to transfer property at
death.
The opinion further delineated the advantages of the trust, saying that
a document which can stand as a trust is not invalid because it avoids
the need for a will.56 If a property owner can find inter vivos means of
property disposition that will render a will unnecessary, he has a right
to use it. It is immaterial that the transfer motive is to obtain will advan-
tages without making one.5 7
This Note does not quarrel with the validity of such trusts; indeed, they
serve a valuable purpose in avoiding probate expenses and allowing flex-
ibility in estate planning.58 However, the trust document itself, simple in
51Westerfield v. Huckaby, 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971).
Sw1d. at 190-91.
5d.
541d. at 192. The court noted that, were it to follow the 1935 Restatement of Trusts, it
would strike down the Miller trusts. However, the 1959 edition of the Restatement of Trusts
expressly adopted such trusts as the better and prevailing rule.
$51d. at 193. The trust provided that, should Mrs. Miller become legally incapacitated,
the successor trustee would be appointed in her place. Thus, conceivably, this trustee could
be charged with fiduciary duties to the life beneficiary, Mrs. Miller. This is the slender thread
the court used to call the transfer "non-testamentary."
.
6Id. It should be noted that the advantages of a living trust lessen because of independent
administration of estates in Texas: the executor manages the probate estate without court
supervision, just like the trustee of a revocable trust.
Snld.
"Section 58(a) of the Probate Code specifically authorizes pour-over trusts in which a
settlor can state in his will that he devises his property to pass to the trustee of any existing
trust, even though the settlor retains extensive control over the trust property. In other words,
the probate estate pours over into the trust and the trust terms then control disposition of
the assets.
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form, with no attestation, obviously seeks to dispose of property at death,
despite the court's theory of its being "presently operative." The court was
satisfied that the written trust expressed Mrs. Wilkin's desires and took
a common-sense approach to the trust, validating it as a will substitute.
Thus, absent fraud, the court was willing to effectuate the transferor's in-
tent.5 9
Mrs. Miller was able to dispose of property by drawing up a simple
trust agreement and signing it, while the Wich will, though witnessed by
two persons, was void due to form technicality. The reasoning of the cas-
es is diametrically opposed.
D. Bank Accounts with Survivorship Rights
The second will substitute category consists of property passing by right
of survivorship. This includes joint bank accounts with survivorship pro-
visions, P.O.D. accounts, and Totten trusts. In 1979, the Texas legisla-
ture passed Chapter XI of the Texas Probate Code, the first attempt to
comprehensively codify rules dealing with non-probate transfers at death.
It dealt with account agreements between depositors and financial insti-
tutions. 60 Chapter XI, which deals with multiple-party accounts, exempli-
fies the legislature's willingness to provide useful tools for expediting ac-
cess to funds at death through various vehicles other than wills. Again,
no will formalities are required.
"Joint accounts" are defined as accounts payable on request to one or
more of two or more parties whether or not there is a right of survivor-
ship. 61 If a party who dies has previously signed a written agreement pro-
viding that his share will "survive" to the surviving party, the sums re-
maining on deposit are owned by the surviving party. 62 Thus, a joint ac-
count with right of survivorship essentially acts like a will, transferring
the decedent's share to the survivor.63 Once again, no will formalities are
mandated for these transfers other than the deceased person's signature
on an account card.
The P.O.D. account, newly introduced by Chapter XI, is billed by some
as the "Poor Man's Will" and promises to provide a very useful tool for
59Johanson points out that revocable trusts do not satisfy the three functions underlying
will formalities, especially as regards the evidentiary function. He notes that the informali-
ty attending the making of such trusts could be a cause for concern. Johanson, supra note
46, at 550-53.
6OMcLaughlin, Joint Accounts, Totten Trusts, and the Poor Man's Will, 44 TEx. B.J. 871
(1981).61TEX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 436(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
6'EX. PROD. CODE ANN. § 439(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
O3Section 441 of the Probate Code, however, gives effect to the account transfers on a
contract theory, specifically stating the transfers are not to be considered testamentary.
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effecting simple, expeditious transfers at death. 64
During the original payee's lifetime, P.O.D. accounts are owned and
payable to him. When the original payee dies, the account is owned by
and payable to the P.O.D. payee or payees who are then surviving.65 These
accounts are also basically death-transfer vehicles, with rights to final with-
drawal attaching at death.
Another death transfer vehicle, the Totten trust, has gained statutory
recognition in Texas in Chapter XI.66 These "A in trust for B" accounts
are treated basically as revocable gifts owned beneficially by the desig-
nated trustee and payable to him during his lifetime. If the beneficiary
survives the trustee, he owns and may withdraw the account unless there
is clear and convincing evidence of a contrary intent. 67 Again, the legisla-
ture has streamlined account handling through withdrawal rights, seek-
ing to give effect to the transferor's intent.
In coming years, the joint accounts, P.O.D. accounts and Totten trusts
are likely to become popular tools in asset disposition. The new statutes
clarify and simplify ownership transfer rules for depositors, and allow
property transfer at death without a need for will compliance. 68
The above concepts can be easily illustrated by a hypothetical. Mrs.
Miller, an elderly woman, sets up a valid P.O.D. account with a $250,000
deposit, payable to Mr. Huckaby when she dies. She merely signs an ac-
count card at the bank. She then draws up a will leaving property worth
$400 to her Aunt Lou. (Mrs. Miller has her life-long attorney help her
write the will.) Mrs. Miller and two witnesses go through a formal execu-
tion ceremony, Mrs. Miller signing the will and the self-proving clause,
and the witnesses signing only the self-proving clause. Under current Texas
law, the $250,000 is Mr. Huckaby's when Mrs. Miller dies. But under the
Wich decision, even though the court believes Mrs. Miller intended to make
a valid will, the will is void and the $400 will pass by intestate succession.
The disparities and inequities are obvious.
What, then, is the remedy for the Wich dilemma? The supreme court
has reaffirmed its technical statutory interpretation of section 59 through
the Wich decision, despite persuasive arguments against the Boren rule.
The court is unwilling to relax its stringent view of will formality require-
ments; at the same time, it emphasizes the legislature's right to effect chang-
es in will requirements. 69
Thus, the resolution of the Wich dilemma clearly will not be found in
the judiciary; the remedy must instead be found in legislatively reform-
"McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 874.
65Tsx. PRoD. CoDE ANN. §§ 438(b), 439(b), 446 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
"McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 874.
67TEx. PRoB. CODE ANN. § 439(c) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
"McLaughlin, supra note 60, at 875.
"9652 S.W.2d at 355.
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ing the law of wills. This is a reform whose time has come, given the trends
towards effectuating a transferor's intent.
IV. THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM IN THE LAw oF WILLS
A. Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
When a formal will defect is found, as in Wich, the Texas courts have
denied themselves all flexibility, no matter how sympathetic the devisees
or how remote and undeserving the intestate takers.70 Countless hardships
have been worked on those whose devises have been voided due to
"harmless" errors.
The rule of literal compliance with will formalities operates to relieve
the courts from having to engage in fact-finding concerning decedents' in-
tentions. When due execution is found, testamentary intent is presumed. 7
This presumption is certainly functional. It simplifies probate since the
court need only inquire as to whether the formalty checklist has been met.
It establishes prima facie evidence that the will was validly executed. How-
ever, when an execution defect is found, proof of testamentary intent is
absolutely forbidden, often leading to harsh, inequitable results.
The comparative informality of will substitutes renders the literal com-
pliance rule more indefensible than ever. 72
Commentators have espoused benefits of a doctrine called "substantial
compliance."73 This doctrine would enable proponents of a defectively ex-
ecuted will to prove that the particular defect was harmless to the pur-
poses of the will formalities. Thus, the proponents would be permitted
to prove in cases of defective execution what they are now entitled to
presume in cases of due execution -the existence of testamentary intent
and the fulfillment of Wills Act purposes.74 The doctrine would admit to
probate a noncomplying instrument that the court determined was truly
a testator's attempt at a valid will.
The wills statutes would be retained in their present form, with this ad-
ditional amendment.
In any case where the (here insert either "court" or "jury" depend-
ing upon the desires of the legislature) is convinced that a docu-
ment signed by a testator represents in whole or in part his good
faith attempt to devise his property at death, then such document
shall be enforced according to its terms. This section applies on-
7QLangbein, supra note 45, at 500-01.
7id. at 501-02.
72Id. at 504.
73Id. See also Comment, An Analysis of the History of Present Status of American Wills
Statutes, 28 Osno ST. L. J. 293 (1967).
74Langbein, supra note 45, at 513.
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ly to testamentary documents, which, except for the requirement
of the testator's signature
1) are found not to be executed according to section 59 of the
Probate Code; and
2) the deficiency mentioned in 1) above is the only barrier pre-
venting such testamentary document from otherwise being en-
forced according to its terms.
The phrase "testamentary document" includes any writing which,
under applicable law, would normally be required to be executed
according to the Probate Code. 7s
With such a substantial compliance doctrine, the courts, on an ad hoc
basis, would be able to validate clearly meritorious wills without strict
compliance with the statute of wills.76 Wills now denied probate, solely
because of technical errors, could thus be given effect. Evidentiary for-
malities such as the testators signature would remain indispensable, where-
as "misplaced" witness signatures, as in Wich, could easily be shown to
be harmless.
The incentive for due execution would remain by requiring high stan-
dard of proof. Lawyers generally opt for maximum formalities in order
to be in the strongest position to defend the will. The substantial compli-
ance statute would pertain only to those wills where the testator, acting
without counsel or with incompetent counsel, has failed to comply fully
with the Wills Act formalities. 77
Certainly, not every defectively executed instrument would result in
a contest. The proponents' burden of proof on many issues would be so
heavy that they would forego the trouble of pointless litigation; on other
issues, the proponents' burden would be so light that potential contest-
ants would not bother to litigate. 78 South Australia, a common-law juris-
diction, enacted a substantial compliance statute in 1976. The statute is
functioning smoothly and has not increased litigation. 79
B. Savings Statute for Defective Self-Proved Wills
Alternatively, if the legislature is unwilling to enact such a broad sub-
stantial compliance statute, at the very least it should enact a savings stat-
ute specifically designed for self-proved wills which are defectively exe-
"Comment, supra note 73, at 322.
76Id.
761d.
7Langbein, supra note 45, at 525. An equivalent substantial compliance doctrine has been
functioning smoothly in the sphere of the major will substitute, life insurance, for decades,
in situations where there are technical violations of the testament-like formalities for change
of beneficiary designations. Id. at 527-29.
7id. at 525.
79Langbein, supra note 41, at 1194-95.
[Vol. 35:901
HeinOnline  -- 35 Baylor L. Rev. 918 1983
NOTES
cuted. The statute could validate wills where the witnesses signed only
the self-proving clause, but did so with the intent to attest to the will.
Like the substantial compliance doctrine, the savings statute would cast
the burden of proof upon the will proponents to show that the documents
expressed the testator's true intentions. This proof could be accomplished
through credible testimony of attesting witnesses. If the court believed that
the misplaced signatures were a harmless defect, the will then could be
admitted to probate just as though duly executed. Surely the law should
protect a testator who thought he did everything that was necessary to
execute a valid will. A savings statute would not lead to fraud if the courts
maintained control over the standard of proof required.w°
V. CONCLUSION
The decision in Wich v. Fleming exemplifies the Texas Supreme Court's
rigid view toward compliance with the statute of wills. When contrasted
with the informalities of present-day will substitutes, the result appears
even more inequitable.
The court has shown itself unwilling to adopt a more flexible, com-
mon-sense approach towards will formalities, thus the legislature must
solve the dilemma. A substantial compliance statute would enable the
courts to adjudicate whether or not formal defects are harmless. At the
very least, a savings statute should be enacted for self-proved wills with
misplaced signatures. The legislature should recognize the court's undue
preoccupation with technicality and reform the law of wills.
Melissa Webb
80See Schneider, supra note 7, at 551-52.
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